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INTRODUCTION
Corruption, defined as the illicit use of one’s position or power for perceived personal or
collective gain, is both a state and a process that reflects not only the corrupt behavior of an
individual but also the dangerous, viruslike infection of a group, organization, industry, nation,
or geopolitical entity (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008; Tepper, Carr, Breaux,
Geider, Hu, & Hua, 2009). It is a multilevel real-world phenomenon, directly or indirectly,
related to money (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño,
2010). Money is universally accepted across cultures; however, the meaning of money (Colquitt,
LePine, & Wesson, 2011) is in the eye of beholder (McClelland, 1967). Very little research has
tested the validity of this oft-cited proposition empirically in a large scale cross-cultural study—
the love of money is the root of all evil (Tang & Chiu, 2003; Tang & Chen, 2008).
Following the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991), we investigate the
relationship between attitude (love of money) and behavioral intention (work-related corrupt
intent) in this study. Further, the justice literature suggests that perceptions of inequity provoke
dishonesty, theft, or corruption (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Gino & Pierce, 2009;
Greenberg, 1993, 2002; Huseman, Hatfield, Miles, 1987). Pay satisfaction (Heneman & Judge,
2000) reflects perception of one’s pay equity and distributive justice. Following the adage,
“whoever loves money is never satisfied with his or her income” (Tang et al., 2006), we assert
that pay satisfaction moderates the love of money to work-related corrupt intent relationship.
The person-situation interactionist model of ethical decision-making (Kish-Gephart et al.,
2010; Rousseau & Fried, 2001; Treviño, 1986) suggests that most people look to the social
context to determine what is ethically right and wrong (Bandura, 1986), obey authority figures
(Litzky, Eddleston, & Kidder, 2006; Milgram, 1974) and laws, and do what is rewarded. We
expand TPB (Ajzen, 1991) and treat Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index,
CPI, a prevalent subjective social norm (Ajzen, 1991), as a proxy of a good/bad barrel at the
entity/country level (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Victor & Cullen, 1988). We argue that the
moderating role of pay satisfaction varies across levels of CPI.
In summary, we investigate the relationship between love of money and corrupt intent
(one aspect of evil) by incorporating pay satisfaction at Level 1 and CPI at Level 2 and develop a
multi-level theory of corruption in this study (Ashforth et al., 2008; Tepper et al., 2009). We
posit a significant cross-level, three-way interaction effect of love of money, pay satisfaction,
and CPI on work-related corrupt intent and test this theoretical model in a large cross-cultural
study. We present our hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant cross-level, three-way interaction effect.
Hypothesis 1a: Managers with high love of money and high pay satisfaction in low CPI
entities have the highest magnitude of work-related corrupt intent; whereas those with
low love of money and high pay satisfaction in high CPI entities have the lowest.
Hypothesis 1b: The intensity of the relationship between love of money and work-related
corrupt intent is stronger for managers with low pay satisfaction in the high CPI group
than those with low pay satisfaction in the low CPI group.

METHODS
Sample and Procedure
Collaborators adopted the English survey or translated it into their native language using
the multistage translation/back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1980) and collected data in a
single or multiple cities in both public and private sectors. Participants completed the surveys
voluntarily, anonymously. The return rate varied between 45% and 100%. We collected data
from 6,586 managers (Level 1) in 32 geopolitical entities (Level 2) across six continents. For the
present study, we deleted the Italian sample with missing variables and used data from a sample
of 6,382 managers (Level 1) in 31 geopolitical entities (Level 2) across six continents. Managers
were 34.66 years old, 50.6 percent male, with 15.35 years of education, and an average income
of US$14,199.15. The average sample size was 205.9 per entity/country.
Measures
We selected the 12-item, 4-factor Love of Money Scale (Tang & Chiu, 2003) with
Factors Rich, Motivator, Importance, and Power. We employed a 5-point Likert scale with the
following anchors: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neutral (3), agree (4), and strongly agree
(5). We adopted 18-item, 4-factor Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire with Factors Pay Level, Raises,
Benefits, and Pay Administration (Heneman & Schwab, 1985) and the following anchors:
strongly dissatisfied (1), dissatisfied (2), neutral (3), satisfied (4), and strongly satisfied (5). We
included a 7-item Work-related Corrupt Intent Scale (Sardžoska & Tang, 2011; Tang & Chiu,
2003; Tang & Tang, 2010) using the following anchors: very low probability (1), low probability
(2), average (3), high probability (4), and very high probability (5). We used three different scale
anchors for these measures to deliberately avoid common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Among several indices related to ethical values/cultures in different
entities (Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Bribe Payers’ Index, the Global Corruption
Barometer, Global Corruption Report (Global Index of Bribery) and the World Values Survey),
we selected CPI due to our large sample size at the entity level (N = 31). A high CPI score
signifies low corruption.
RESULTS
We found a good fit between our measurement model and our data for our love of
money, pay satisfaction, and corrupt intent scales using the whole sample and achieved
configural and metric invariance for these measures across three CPI groups: High CPI (CPI >
5.5, n = 2,761: Australia, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Malta, Oman, Portugal, Singapore,
Slovenia, Spain, Taiwan, and the USA), Medium CPI (5.5 > CPI > 3.5, n = 1,269: Brazil,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand); and Low CPI (3.5 >
CPI, n = 2,352: China, Croatia, Congo, Egypt, Macedonia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the
Philippines, Romania, Russia, and Turkey). We examined the common method variance (CMV)
in two steps (Podsakoff et al., 2003). First, Harman’s single-factor test examines the unrotated
factor solution involving all items of interest in an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Results
showed eight factors with eigenvalues greater than one. Second, the measurement model with the
addition of an unmeasured latent common method variance (CMV) factor did not improve the fit

over our measurement model without a CMV factor. Thus, the common method variance (CMV)
was not a concern in this study. We test our theoretical model below.
We employed Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2010, Version 6) for our cross-level analysis.
In our within-level analysis, we used love of money and pay satisfaction to predict corrupt intent
(Level 1). The between-level variable was CPI (Level 2). The random slope S1 was defined by
the linear regression of corrupt intent on the interaction effect between love of money and pay
satisfaction. We regressed S1 on CPI in our between-level analysis. Our cross-level, three-way
interaction effect on corrupt intent was significant (-2.61, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 1.
Following Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and Richter (2006), we plotted four slopes for the
three-way interaction effect and compared six pairs of slopes using t tests.
We labeled Slope 1 as managers with high pay satisfaction in high CPI entities and Slope
2 as those with high pay satisfaction in low CPI entities. For Slope 1, managers with low love of
money had the lowest magnitude of corrupt intent (good apples). For Slope 2, those with high
love of money had the highest magnitude of corrupt intent (bad apples), supporting Hypothesis
1a. Further, we labeled Slope 3 as managers with low pay satisfaction in high CPI group and
Slope 4 as those with low pay satisfaction in low CPI group. Slope 3 showed the strongest
intensity whereas Slope 4 had the weakest and the difference between the two was significant (t
= 3.09, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 1b. For those with high pay satisfaction, the intensity of
the relationship between love of money and corrupt intent was almost identical regardless of
whether they were in the low or the high CPI entities (Slope 1 vs. Slope 2: t = .31, p > .05).
There were no significant differences between Slopes 1 and 4 (t = 1.81, p > .05), between Slopes
2 and 4 (t = 1.63, p > .05), between Slopes 2 and 3, and between Slopes 1 and 3.
DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications. The relationship between love of money and work-related
corrupt intent is moderated by pay satisfaction at the micro level and CPI at the macro level,
supporting and expanding the interactionist theory of ethical decision making (Kish-Gephart et
al., 2010) and theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Love of money (attitude) is
significantly related to corrupt intent (behavioral intention) (Ajzen, 1991; Grant, 2008; Tang &
Baumeister, 1984). With “high pay satisfaction”, the intensity (slope) for the relationship
between love of money and corrupt intent is almost identical for managers in high or low CPI
entities. The magnitude (intercept) of work-related corrupt intent for high or low CPI groups is
significantly different. The former (high pay satisfaction and high CPI) has the lowest
magnitude, whereas the latter (high pay satisfaction and low CPI) has the highest. As expected,
managers in high CPI countries/entities have lower work-related corrupt intent than those in low
CPI entities. Thus, CPI is a strong moderator.
In the high CPI entities (good barrels), high pay satisfaction enhances integrity and curbs
corruption because a satisfied need is no longer a motivator (Maslow, 1954). The cost of
corruption is too high for the benefit (Tepper et al., 2007). Managers do not want to take the risks
and lose their freedom, dignity, integrity, and reputation in their lives (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2005). However, for people with high pay satisfaction in the low CPI entities (bad barrels), love
of money fuels the corruption fire (Grant, 2008) causing them to have the highest magnitude of
corrupt intent in this study. Bribery accounted for at least 20 percent of the total wage
compensation in the public sector (Lambsdorff, 1999; McCarthy & Puffer, 2008).We speculate
that managers with high pay satisfaction (money earned legally or illegally) take corruption for

granted, have the strongest winner-take-all mentality (the Matthew Effect; Merton, 1968; Tang,
1996), and consider corruption as an entitlement. Since money is an addictive, insatiable drug
(Lea & Webley, 2006), they need larger dosages to maintain the same level of “high” or utility of
money and want more money after becoming members of the kleptocractic class (Grossman,
1999). Thus, bad apples appear by the bushel in bad barrels (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). Due to
meager resources, they may have nothing to lose and ignore the risks of loosing their freedom,
dignity, integrity, and reputation. Even incarcerated, some may live comfortable with all the
luxuries because money talks in a corrupted environment.
The intensity of the relationship between love of money and work-related corrupt intent
for managers with low pay satisfaction in the high CPI group is significantly stronger than that in
the low CPI group. Pay satisfaction matters more in high CPI entities than in low CPI entities.
Low pay satisfaction in high CPI entities greatly enhances managers’ intensity of corrupt intent
due to their higher sensitivity to pay equity and justice (Huseman et al., 1987). Results support
the justice literature that with perceptions of injustice, people will steal in the name of justice
(Gino & Pierce, 2009; Greenberg, 1993). We speculate that in a corrupt culture, the notion of
equity or justice may or may not be highly valued as those managers in high CPI entities. With
scarce resources and income, managers with low pay satisfaction in low CPI entities may have
missed the opportunity for becoming a member of “the good ole boys club”, or kleptocracy (rule
by thieves, Grossman, 1999) due to the lack of resources (position, power, personal contact, and
public visibility). They have low sensitivity to inequity and very little “hope” for justice. As a
consequence, they develop the “learned helplessness” in that environment (Abramson, Seligman,
& Teasdale, 1978). They have high magnitude but low intensity of corrupt intent because they do
not do it for the love of money. Finally, we conclude that pay satisfaction is a double-edged
sword with both positive and negative consequences. The impact of pay satisfaction on
corruption may vary across high or low CPI entities. In summary, our research reveals (1) the
relationship between love of money and work-related corrupt intent supporting the attitude-tobehavioral-intent aspect of TPB, (2) the importance of incorporating pay satisfaction at the micro
level from the justice literature into TPB, (3) the value of integrating CPI, a subjective social
norm, or contextual variable at the macro level (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Treviño, 1986) into
TPB, (4) the expansion of TPB from an individual-level theory to a multi-level theory, (5) an
easy way to tease out good and bad apples’ unseen behavioral patterns in good or bad barrels and
make them clearly visible in a new perspective, (6) identify not only contributions but
boundaries of several theories (Ajzen, 1991; Ashforth et al., 2008; Herzberg, 1987; Milkovich et
al., 2011).
Empirical Contributions. We incorporate pay satisfaction and CPI in our understanding
of love of money to corrupt intent relationship based on a large sample of 6,382 managers in 31
geopolitical entities across six continents. Results regarding measurement models for the whole
sample and measurement invariance across three CPI groups enhance the generalizability of our
findings and offer confidence to future researchers in using these scales in underresearched areas
of the world (Kirkman & Law, 2005). Our counterintuitive discoveries (Bartunek, Rynes, &
Ireland, 2006) are impossible to achieve without a large sample size at both Level l and Level 2.
Practical Implications. Our results support the notion that the love of money is related to
corrupt intent. Although it is difficult to manage managers’ love of money because people bring
dispositional values to organizations (Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986), executives can still properly

manage it in organizations. People need money (a hygiene factor) continuously to maintain their
lives (Herzberg, 1987). “People do work for money—but they work even more for meaning in
their lives” (Pfeffer, 1998: 112). Executives have strong control over their malleable
compensation systems and can pay managers fairly and well. Managers with high pay
satisfaction have a sense of self-sufficiency (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006), take their minds off
money (Kohn, 1993), elevate their virtue and wisdom, inculcate their stewardship behaviors, and
supplant opportunism and self-interest (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005). Objective income, financial
experiences, and ethical cultural values may shape or modify one’s love of money and behavior.
Tang et al. (2011) also found that managers in low CPI entities with low corporate ethical
values (CEV) have the highest magnitude (intercept) of corrupt intent, whereas those in high CPI
entities with high CEV have the lowest. People in “high CPI entities with low CEV” or in “low
CPI entities with high CEV” have almost identical intensity and magnitude of corrupt intent.
Furthermore, the intensity between love of money and corrupt intent is the strongest for
managers in “high CPI entities with low CEV” and the weakest for those in low CPI entities with
low CEV. Top executives in high CPI entities with low pay satisfaction and low corporate ethical
values (CEV) may have not only the strongest intensity but also the highest magnitude of
corruption and engage in grand corruption (kleptocracy). As Ariely pointed out that “when
cheating is one step removed from cash”, people tend to rationalize and justify their dishonesty
easily. “Such latitude is the force behind the Enrons of the world” (2008: 24). Regardless of CPI,
increasing corporate ethical values in organizations may also greatly reduce corruption because
most people do want to receive reward and avoid punishment in the social context (Fisman &
Miguel, 2007). Executives have more control over corporate ethical values than the CPI (entity
level). We assert that ethical values are both important at the organization and entity levels.
Conclusion. In order to eradicate corruption, boost business ethics globally, and maintain
sustainable development in the competitive market, executives must implement an effective and
efficient compensation system to cultivate a sense of justice, manage all stakeholders fairly and
well, monitor love of money, pay satisfaction, firm-level pressures (Martin et al., 2007), and
different forms of temptations across borders; valorize corporate ethical values; and inspire
personal integrity (Feiner, 2004; Simons, 2002), implement organizational corruption control
elements—bureaucratic control, punishment, incentive alignments, legal/regulatory sanctioning,
social sanctioning, vigilance controls, self-control, and concertive controls (Lange, 2008), and
fully aware of the contextual environment at micro and macro levels under which they operate.
Although it pays to enhance managers’ pay satisfaction and curb corruption, in general, our
present finding challenges the assumptions that (1) the relationship between love of money and
corrupt intent is the same across cultures, (2) high pay satisfaction is a good and important goal
to pursue for all people around the world, and (3) the moderating effect of pay satisfaction on the
love of money to corrupt intent relationship is the same across levels of CPI. Our research offers
a new and robust theory that captures the complexity of organizational phenomena and realworld relevance in the field of management (Bamberger, 2008). We trust that our results provide
a new perspective on behavioral ethics, relate to the globalization of the economy and
internalization of management research, promote theory development and testing, and further
research and improved practice (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007).
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